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ABSTRACT
VALIDATING THE OUTCOME OF AN ACTION: THE IMPACTS OF GOAL
AND SEMANTIC INFORMATION
Greta Ching Chan, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University, 2017
Joseph P. Magliano, Director
Narratives are comprised of characters performing goal-direct actions that are executed to
achieve some outcome(s). Understanding why an action is performed by a character in a story
involves an assessment of the alignment of that action with a goal, but in addition may involve
an assessment of whether the action can lead to the obtainment of the object of that goal. How do
readers determine whether an action will or will not lead to a desired outcome? This dissertation
was designed to explore a potential answer to this question.
Validation is a process in which the reader evaluates the plausibility of an outcome that is
preceded by an action. For example, Dorothy poured the bucket of water on the fire (action). The
fire went out (outcome). Most readers will consider this outcome plausible because it is
commonly known that water extinguishes fire. In this example, the plausibility of the outcome is
evaluated against the laws of nature. In some other cases, the plausibility of an outcome is
constrained by psychological, instead of physical, factors. For example: Joe went to a bar
(action). He got a beer (outcome). How likely that Joe, who goes to a bar, will get a beer? Would
that outcome be more plausible if an explicit goal to get a beer was established – Joe really
wanted a beer? Such a goal would provide an important causal antecedent to the action that
leads to the outcome.

The purpose of this study is to investigate if validation is affected by the presence of an
explicit goal and level of semantic constraint between an action and its outcome. In two
experiments, participants read a set of three-sentence micro stories. For example, S1: Joe really
wanted a beer (goal present) /Joe finished a hard day at work (goal absent). S2: He went to a bar
after work (high semantic constraint) / He went to a restaurant after work (low semantic
constraint). S3: He got a beer and felt much better. S1 describes an explicit goal or initiating
event that would explain the action in S2. S2 varies in the extent that it has semantic constraint
with the outcome in S3. It is important to note that S1 and S2 always provide the causal
antecedents sufficient to explain the outcome in S3. Validation was assessed by measuring the
reading time of S3. It is assumed that faster reading time is indicative of the perception of more
plausible outcomes.
A causal constraint hypothesis postulates that the validation of an outcome will be
facilitated by having an explicitly stated goal that causally explains why the action would lead to
the outcome. This is because the goal elaborates the action, leading to the activation of world
knowledge supported by the outcome. A semantic constraint hypothesis postulates that
validating outcomes can be supported by conceptual overlap between an outcome and an action
that causally leads to it. For example, validating that Joe was able to get a beer would be
relatively more facilitated by the action of him going to a bar than the action of him going to a
restaurant. Presumably, going to a bar would be more likely to lead to the activation of
alcoholic drinks than going to a restaurant.

In Experiment 1, the presence of the goal in S1 was manipulated along with the level of
semantic constraint between the action (in S2) and the outcome (in S3). However, as is noted in
the materials for Experiment 1, the goal object (e.g., beer) is present in both the goal sentence
and the outcome sentence. As such, Experiment 2 was conducted to determine if the impact of
the presence of an explicit goal affects validation over and above the presence of a goal object. In
Experiment 2, the initiating-event condition (Joe finished a hard day at work) was replaced by a
goal-object-only condition (Joe saw a beer bottle) and the remaining parts of the materials were
identical to those in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 1, both the causal constraint hypothesis and the semantic constraint
hypothesis were supported. The outcome statements were read faster in the goal present
condition (compared to the initiating-event condition) and in the high-semantic-constraint
condition (compared to the low-semantic constraint condition). This suggests that the presence of
goals and semantic constraint between the action and outcome facilitate validation in parallel
contributions. This result is consistent with the line of research that demonstrates that a
supporting context facilitates the retrieval of knowledge that supports the perceptions of
plausibility of events and their integration with the prior discourse context
Experiment 2 was conducted to investigate the sole impacts of an explicit goal on
plausibility judgment controlling for the impacts of noun overlap between S1 and S3 (i.e., the
mentioning of the goal object in both S1 and S3). In Experiment 2, only the causal constraint
hypothesis was supported. It was demonstrated that the presence of an explicit goal is over and
above the presence of a goal object.

Readers make inferences when reading. The plausibility of these inferences is checked
against background knowledge. This process is called validation in some literature. The results
of the present study are consistent with the literature that demonstrates that the outcome of
validation (or plausibility judgment) is affected by two factors: Causal and semantic relations
among sentences. An event is considered plausible if it has a causal or semantic relation with a
preceding event.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Narratives are comprised of characters performing goal-direct actions that are executed to
achieve some outcome(s). In fact, there is considerable evidence that readers routinely
understand character actions in terms of their alignment with explicit or readily inferable goals
(Dopkins, Klin, & Myers, 1993; Huitema, Dopkins, Klin, & Myers, 1993. Long & Golding,
1993; Lutz & Radvansky, 1997; Magliano & Radvansky, 2001; Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso
& Suh, 1993; Trabasso, van den Broek, & Suh, 1989). Understanding why an action is
performed by a character in a story involves an assessment of the alignment of that action with a
goal, but in addition may involve an assessment of whether the action can lead to the obtainment
of the object of that goal. For example, going to a sporting goods store is more likely to lead to
the positive outcome of getting a desired bike than going to a grocery store. How do readers
determine whether an action will or will not lead to a desired outcome? The current study is
designed to explore a potential answer to this question.
One process that might support the evaluation of whether an action will lead to a desired
outcome is validation, which has received increased attention in recent years (Richter & Rapp,
2014). Validation is a process in which the reader evaluates the plausibility of event (Cook &
O’Brien, 2014; Rapp, Hinze, Slaten, & Horton, 2014; Richter, Schroeder, & Wöhrmann, 2009;
Singer, 2013; Singer & Halldorson, 1996). Validation of narrative events could be supported by
an assessment of the causal relationship between a current narrative event and the narrative

2
events that precede it (Singer & Halldorson, 1996; Trabasso, van den Broek, & Suh, 1989). As
such, the validation of an outcome could be facilitated by having an explicitly stated goal that
explains the causal relation between an action and its outcome.
It has been recently postulated that validation in the context of narratives is also
supported by memory-based processes (Cook & O’Brien, 2014; Isberner & Richter, 2013;
O’Brien & Cook, 2016 a, 2016 b; Richter, Schroeder, & Wöhrmann, 2009). As such, validating
outcomes can also be supported by conceptual overlap between discourse constituents because
that overlap will increase the likelihood that knowledge needed to validate an outcome will be
available in working memory. For example, when readers read that Joe went to a bar, then the
semantic constraint between bar and beer may be sufficient to validate the outcome that Joe got a
beer from the waitress. It may not be necessary to state explicitly in the text that Joe wanted to
drink a beer for readers to validate the plausibility of him receiving a beer in this context. In this
dissertation, semantic constraint refers to a situational or contextual constraint that affords
certain events to occur in certain situations or contexts. With this constraint, the outcome of an
action is highly predictable. For example, X went to a salon (action). X had a haircut (outcome).
In this case, the outcome is highly predictable because this outcome is restricted by the situation
in which the action takes place (people typically go to a salon to have a haircut). However,
getting a haircut in a strip mall is possible, but that action is less constrained by that location
because one can accomplish other goals in that location.
The goal of this study is to explore the extent to which the presence of a goal and lower
level semantic constraint that affect memory-based processes support the validation of the
outcome of an action. It is likely that the validation of an outcome is supported by both the
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presence of a goal and semantic constraint between the outcome and a prior action. However,
the relationship between these factors in support of elaboration is not well understood. Given the
importance of tracking explicit goals of characters during narrative comprehension (e.g., Lutz &
Radvansky, 1997; Magliano & Radvansky, 2001; Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso & Suh,
1993), it is possible that the presence of a goal is a more dominant factor than lower level
semantics. On the other hand, given that outcomes are directly causally related to actions rather
than goals (Trabasso et al., 1989), the semantic information associated with the action may be
sufficient to support validation of an outcome.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
What Is Validation?

Validation is viewed as a process in which the reader evaluates the plausibility of events
(Singer, Halldorson, Lear, & Andrusiak, 1992; Singer, Revlin, & Halldorson, 1990). For
example, Dorothy poured the bucket of water on the fire. The fire went out. Most readers will
consider this outcome plausible because it is commonly known that water extinguishes fire.
When the outcome statement is changed to the fire grew hotter (after the same antecedent action
Dorothy poured the bucket of water on the fire), readers tend to construct a mediating fact that
water feeds fire. This fact is compared against the common-sense knowledge that water
extinguishes fire. When readers detect a contradiction between a mediating fact and the fact from
background knowledge, the outcome is deemed implausible. Singer (1993) found that readers
took considerably longer times to read an outcome that is implausible with respect to an
antecedent action than an outcome that is plausible.
Given the fact that the events that we experience can range from highly plausible to
highly implausible, the outcome of validation can be viewed as occurring on a continuum
(Brincones & Otero, 1994; Cook & O’Brien, 2014; Glenberg, Wilkinson, & Epstein, 1982).
Moreover, the process of validation can be more or less effortful, depending on the nature of the
reading materials. The extent to which validation is based on memory-based or effortful
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processes may be contingent on the nature of the texts and tasks, and as such these perspectives
should not be construed as mutually exclusive.
Validating Expository Texts
When reading and learning from expository texts, validation may require effort because
these texts often contain domain-specific information or information that is not familiar to the
readers (Brincones & Otero, 1994; Cook & Mayer, 1988; Glenberg, Wilkinson, & Epstein, 1982;
Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Loughlin, 1988; Meyer, Brandt, & Bluth, 1980; Otero, 1992;
Otero & Campanario, 1990; Otero & Kintsch, 1992). Consider the following:
Similarly, because of currency devaluation our exported goods are cheaper to
foreigners, increasing their demand for those goods.
In response to changing economic conditions, U.S. manufacturers have been
forced to cut back inventories, thus increasing delivery time and limiting foreign
demand for exportable goods. (Glenberg, Wilkinson, & Epstein, 1982, p. 602)
Obviously, an increase in demand for U.S. manufactured goods should lead to an increase in
manufacturing. But Glenberg et al. showed that college students detected contradictions only
about 51% of time. One possible explanation is that the unfamiliar knowledge may not support
the activation of background knowledge that would afford the detection of the contradictions
(Cooke & O’Brien, 2014; Kendeou, Walsh, Smith, & O’Brien, 2014). In this context, readers
may have to engage in a deliberate process of validation that requires one to reason with and
about the content of the texts.
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Validating Everyday Events

When the text describes mundane everyday events (e.g., people drink beer in a bar) or
common-sense knowledge (e.g., water extinguishes fire), there is recent theoretical conjecture
and empirical evidence suggesting that validation is an obligatory part of narrative
comprehension (Cook & O’Brien, 2014; Isberner & Richter, 2014; Lombardi, Sinatra, &
Nussbaum, 2013; Richter, Schroeder, & Wöhrmann, 2009; Singer & Halldorson, 1996; Singer
2013; Voss, Fincher-Kierfer, Wiley, & Silfies, 1993). Evidence for this claim comes from the
fact that readers are fast to notice false information when relevant background knowledge is
active in working memory or is readily accessible in long-term memory (Richter et al., 2009,
Experiments 1 & 2). Moreover, if validation is performed routinely without the conscious
awareness of the reader, the outcome of validation should affect a subsequent unrelated task
(Richter et al., 2009). For example, Richter et al. (2009) had participants read sentences like
Cognac contains alcohol (a true statement); computers have emotions (a false statement). After
reading each sentence, the participants judged whether a word was spelled correctly and
produced a binary yes/no response. Responses to the spelling judgment task were delayed if the
outcome of the judgment contradicted the outcome of validation (i.e., a false statement was
followed by a yes response; or a true statement was followed by a no response). Readers were
not required to make a validation judgment and they nevertheless made the judgment and the
outcome of this judgment interfered with the readers’ performance in an unrelated task, lending
credence to the claim that validation is an epistemic monitoring process and the aim of this
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process is to check for inconsistencies between text elements or between newly encoded and
background knowledge.
Validating Fictional Events
Validation in the context of reading involves evaluating the plausibility of text content
against prior discourse context (Cook & O’Brien, 2014) or generic knowledge of the world
(Singer, 2013; Richter, Schroeder, & Wöhrmann, 2008) or both. When the events to be validated
are neither mundane everyday events nor difficult expository information but imaginary fictional
events, this will present an interesting issue for validation in that the rules that govern the
fictional worlds may deviate from those of the real world. It has been shown that readers’ ability
to generate valid inferences decreases as the rules in the fictional worlds deviate from those that
govern the real world (Graesser, Kassler, Kreuz, & McLain-Allen, 1998). When the rules of a
fictive world do not adhere to the rules of the real world, readers take into consideration this
discrepancy and evaluate the plausibility of narrative events against the fantastic world instead of
the real world. (Foy & Gerrig, 2014; Rapp, Hinze, Slaten, & Horton, 2014). Rapp et al. (2014)
demonstrated that readers compartmentalized unrealistic information when reading fictions. It
may be the case that the detection of narrative events as being invalid against the real world has
led the reader to conclude that a narrative follows a different set of rules and these rules are then
used as the basis for evaluation.
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The RI-VAL Model of Comprehension
RI-VAL is a theoretical framework for validation and it provides a theoretical grounding
for the present study (Cook, 2014; Cook & O’Brien, 2014; O’Brien & Cook, 2016 a, 2016 b).
However, the purpose of this dissertation was not to test the RI-VAL model. This model is
discussed in this dissertation because it provides a theoretical framework to motivate the study
and explicate the cognitive processes that may be associated with the process of validating
outcomes. RI-VAL assumes that validation for narratives involves an effortless, bottom-up
process and comprehension is made up of three mental processes occurring in the following
sequence: reactivation (R), integration (I), and validation (Val). Each of these processes operates
on the output of the previous process. In other words, integration operates on the output of
reactivation and validation operates on the output of integration. These three processes are
parallel but asynchronous (see Figure 2.1). Another assumption that RI-VAL makes is that the
three mental processes are passive and once they have started, they run to completion. RI-VAL
also assumes that validation is affected by factors that support the strength of resonance between
the current discourse input and any information that could be activated to support the validation
process (e.g., degree of feature overlap between information in working memory and information
in long-term memory) (Cook, 2014; Cook & O’Brien, 2014). Specifically, validation sometimes
fails to occur because the to-be-validated information has a high degree of feature overlap with
the to-be-compared concept in long-term memory. For example, readers were less capable to
detect inconsistency when they read that a vegetarian ordered a tuna salad than when they read
that a vegetarian ordered a cheeseburger (Cook & O’Brien, 2014). This is because tuna salad
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shares more common features with a vegetarian diet than does a cheeseburger. The discrepancy
between eating a tuna salad and being a vegetarian might go unnoticed, but this would not be the
case of eating a cheeseburger.

Figure 2.1. RI-VAL model of comprehension.
Passive Integration Via Constraint Satisfaction
What constitutes knowledge activation and integration in the context of RI-VAL? In a
classic view, knowledge is represented as a network of propositions (Kintsch, 1988). The nodes
of the network are propositions that correspond to explicit semantic content in a text and
inferences generated by the reader (Kintsch, 1998). Each node is connected to some neighboring
nodes. At any time of reading, a node is activated. The node will in turn activate other nodes
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linked to it. This spreading of activation is passive, dumb, and unrestricted (O’Brien & Cook,
2016 a, 2016 b). The process is passive in the sense that it is driven by the stimuli in the text, not
the goals of the reader. The process is dumb because the activated concepts are not always
relevant to the active discourse context. The process is unrestricted because the activated
concepts can come from both prior discourse context or general world knowledge. Nodes that
have a large number of connections with other nodes are strengthened whereas those that have
few connections are suppressed. This process is known as passive convergence or constraint
satisfaction (Kintsch, 1998, 2005). Constraint satisfaction is a passive integration process that
has been widely used to estimate how coherent a representation is in multiple disciplines (e.g.,
philosophy, discourse psychology, social psychology, economics, artificial intelligence, etc., for
a comprehensive review, see Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998). The mechanism of passive integration
via constraint satisfaction (Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998) is briefly summarized as follows, using
examples that mirror the design of the current study:
1. Elements are representations such as concepts, propositions, parts of images, goals,
actions, and so on. Consider the following micro text:
S1: Joe really wanted a beer (goal).
S2: He went to a bar after work (action).
S3: He got a beer and felt much better (outcome).
This micro text consists of a goal, an action, and an outcome of the action. These are
three elements upon which a mental representation is built.
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2. A positive constraint between two elements can be satisfied either by accepting both
elements or rejecting both elements.
Example 1
Causal constraint: Joe really wanted a beer.
E1: Joe went to a bar after work. (accepted)
E2: Joe got a beer and felt much better. (accepted)

Situational constraint: Joe went to a bar after work.
E1: Joe really wanted a beer. (accepted)
E2: Joe got a beer and felt much better. (accepted)

In this example, the causal and situational constraints are positive because in each
case, both E1 and E2 are accepted as a valid explanation for the condition described
in the constraint.

Example 2
Causal constraint: Joe really wanted a beer.
E1: Joe went to McDonald’s. (rejected)
E2: Joe got an ice-cream and felt much better. (rejected)

Situational constraint: Joe went to a bar after work.
E1: Joe really wanted an ice-cream. (rejected)
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E2: Joe got an ice-cream and felt much better. (rejected)

In this example, the causal and situational constraints are also positive because in
each case, both E1 and E2 are rejected as a valid explanation for the condition
described in the constraint.

3. A negative constraint between two elements can be satisfied only by accepting one
element and rejecting the other.

Example
Causal constraint: Joe really wanted a beer.
E1: Joe went to McDonald’s. (rejected)
E2: Joe got a beer and felt much better. (accepted)

Situational constraint: Joe went to Starbucks after work.
E1: Joe really wanted a beer. (rejected)
E2: Joe got a cappuccino and felt much better. (accepted)

In this example, the causal and situational constraints are negative because in each
case, E1 is rejected and E2 is accepted as a valid explanation for the condition
described in the constraint.
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4. Elements are said to be coherent if they satisfy a positive constraint. Elements that
satisfy the largest number of positive constraints form the most coherent mental
representation. In the above examples, coherent elements are:
Joe went to a bar after work; Joe got a beer and felt much better.
Joe really wanted a beer; Joe got a beer and felt much better.
Joe went to McDonald’s; Joe got an ice-cream and felt much better.
Joe really wanted an ice-cream; Joe got an ice-cream and felt much better.
Incoherent elements are:
Joe went to McDonald’s; Joe got a beer and felt much better.
Joe really wanted a beer; Joe got a cappuccino and felt much better.
When the texts describe over-learned everyday activities, schemata, or scripts, integration
(via constraint satisfaction) can be a fast and passive process. In the texts used above, both the
causal and situational constraints are satisfied based on feature overlap. For example, when an
element (Joe went to a bar) and a causal constraint (Joe wanted a beer) share a high-level of
feature overlap, the element is accepted. When an element (Joe went to McDonald’s) and a
causal constraint (Joe wanted a beer) have little overlap in lower semantic feature, the element is
rejected. The same is true when an element (Joe got an ice-cream) is evaluated against a
situational constraint (Joe went to a bar).
RI-VAL assumes that the integration process is passive and it operates on the principle of
constraint satisfaction that is part of the Construction-Integration model (Kintsch, 1988, 1998).
This assumption is similar to the immediacy principle (Just & Carpenter, 1980; 1992) in the
sense that integration starts as soon as the threshold of activation is reached. One feature that
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distinguishes RI-VAL from the CI model is that a stage of validation is added to the two-stage
model. After constructing bridging inferences to integrate two or more elements in a text, the
readers check the plausibility of the integration. This process is called validation. For example,
after reading “Joe went to a bar after work (E1); Joe got a beer and felt much better (E2)”, the
reader constructs a bridging inference based on argument overlap: Joe got a beer in the bar. This
outcome of integration is then checked against general world knowledge—Do people drink beer
in a bar? If they do, it is highly plausible that Joe got a beer in the bar.
Validation in the context of narratives based on everyday experience is a fast and routine
process supported via a cycle of spreading activation and integration (cf., Kintsch, 1988). In the
framework of RI-VAL, validation operates on the outcome of integration and integration
operates on the outcome of spreading activation. Stated otherwise, integration (a coherence
building process) mediates the relation between spreading activation and validation. If validation
is mediated by the outcome of integration via constraint satisfaction, the outcome of validation is
also bound by the rules of constraint satisfaction. For example, the outcome of integration is
deemed plausible if both E1 and E2 satisfy a positive causal constraint. The question of interest
is: How does the strength of a constraint affect the perception of coherence, which in turn
mediates the outcome of validation (see Figure 2.2)? It is hypothesized that the strength of a
constraint will have a positive effect on the perception of coherence. In the presence of a strong
constraint such as an explicit goal, E1 and E2 will form a strong cohesion and this will facilitate
the perception of a plausible event (a positive outcome of validation).
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Figure 2.2. A causal model in which the outcome of validation is mediated by the ease of
integration, which is in turn affected by the strength of a constraint.
Validation at Different Levels of Analyses
The bottom up processes that support validation can operate on the level of described
events, or at the level of words that are used in those descriptions. When the outcome of
activation and integration forms a coherent mental model, this model is deemed highly plausible
(Black, Freeman, & Johnson-Laird, 1986; Connell & Keane, 2004). Some researchers who study
the relation between plausibility judgment and coherence judgment proposed that plausibility is
synonymous to coherence and the two terms could be used interchangeably on some occasions
(Connell & Keane, 2004). Consider the following sequence of events: The bottle rolled off the
shelf. The bottle smashed on the floor. Readers think that the second event is highly plausible
given the first one because the two events form a mental representation that can be easily
retrieved from memory (people have seen numerous incidents like this happening in everyday
life and therefore this is a highly coherent or highly plausible event). Consider a counter

16
example: The bottle rolled off the shelf. The bottle melted on the floor (Connell & Keane, 2004).
People rarely see a bottle melt on the floor after falling. For this reason, they tend to think that
the second event is implausible and at the same time, the two sentences are incoherent. Unlike
the coherence of events, which is assessed based on how frequently a phenomenon is seen in
daily life, coherence of word distribution is assessed based on how frequently two or a set of
words are put together in a passage (a data-driven or bottom-up process). If two words are
frequently used together (e.g., green tea), the representation described by the words is considered
plausible. If two words rarely occur together (e.g., blue tea), the representation probably does not
exist. For example, in a study by Lapata, McDonald, & Keller (1999), readers judged the
plausibility of a set of adjective-noun pairs like strong tea and powerful tea. Although strong and
powerful are synonyms, strong is associated with tea more often than powerful. As such, strong
tea is judged to be more plausible than powerful tea.
Factors Affecting Plausibility/Coherence Judgment
Based on the viewpoint that plausibility judgment has the same meaning as coherence
judgment, Connell and Keane (2004) hypothesized that plausibility judgment is affected by the
perception of coherence at the event level and at the word level. In one experiment (Experiment
2), the researchers had participants read sentence pairs like:
The sail caught the wind.
Causal:

The canvas flapped. (strong)
The canvas fluttered. (weak)

Attributal:

The canvas was strong. (strong)
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The canvas was durable. (weak)
The second sentence had four versions. Two versions (causal) invited the participant to make a
causal inference such that the two sentences form a coherent mental representation (with S2
being the causal consequence of S1). Another two versions (attributal) described the physical
quality of one of the nouns in S1. For each of the causal/attributal set of sentences, one sentence
had a significantly stronger distributional relation with S1 than the other sentence (tested by LSA
analyses). After reading each sentence pair, the participant made a plausibility judgement on a 010 scale (with 0 = not plausible, 5 = moderately plausible, 10 = very plausible). Connell and
Keane (2004) found an effect for event coherence but not for word coherence.
Although Connell and Keane (2004) failed to find an effect of word coherence on
plausibility judgment, this effect is evident in another line of research (Todaro, Millis, &
Dandotkar, 2010; Wittwer & Ihme, 2014). A study by Todaro et al. is similar to that by Connell
and Keane in many respects (e.g., use of sentence pairs as stimuli, manipulation of causal and
word coherence, measurement of coherence judgment as DV). One major difference between the
two studies is in the way the researchers define word/semantic coherence. To vary coherence of
words but at the same time control for coherence of concepts/events, Connell and Keane selected
synonyms that yield the same level of concept coherence (when read with S1) but differ in
distributional similarity (when read with the noun immediately before it). For example:
The flowers wilted in the vase. The petals dropped/fell.
The dress snagged on a nail. The satin was priceless/valuable.
The girl hit the mirror. The reflection quivered/shook.
The lightning struck the tree. The branch was huge/big.
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In these examples, participants tend to construct the same mental models for the two versions of
S2 because the manipulated words are having the same dictionary meaning (despite the fact that
one is used more often with the noun prior to it than the other).
In contrast, Todaro et al.’s participants were led to construct four different mental models
after reading four different versions of S1. For example, Susan recognized her baby was sick/
Susan’s husband collapsed on the floor/ Susan recently became a nurse/ Susan’s husband was
working in the den. These four versions of S1 had four unique relations with the subsequent
sentence (S2): She called her family doctor at once. The researchers found that when S1 had a
high causal or semantic relatedness with S2, the mental model was judged to be more coherent
than when S1 had a low causal or semantic relatedness with S2. These findings of Todaro et al.
(2010) were replicated by Wittwer & Ihme (2014) using longer expository texts.
Assessing Plausibility/Coherence Judgment
In both Connell & Keane (2004) and Todaro et al. (2010), plausibility/coherence judgment
was measured using an offline self-reported rating task. This form of assessment is ideal for a
norming study in which the sensitivity and external validity of the materials are determined
experimentally. To demonstrate that plausibility judgment (or validation) is a part of the
comprehension process, this dissertation employed an online assessment of
plausibility/coherence judgment. With respect to the results of Experiment 1 of Todaro et al., it is
hypothesized that plausibility/coherence judgment is affected by causal and semantic constraints
among the elements of a text. Causal constraint was manipulated by stating explicitly the goal of
a character (e.g., X wanted to buy an iPhone), compared to a condition in which the character
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had the potential to accomplish the goal (X had money), or a condition in which only the goal
object is mentioned (X’s friend had a new iPhone). Semantic constraint was manipulated by
describing a physical place where the character went to or a device that the character used to
accomplish a task. The high constraint condition describes a place in which a typical activity is
performed or an object that serves a typical function. For example, bar (drinking), casino
(gambling), salon (hair-cutting), camera (picture taking) etc. The low constraint condition
describes a place in which many different activities can be performed or an object that serves
multiple functions. For example, shopping mall, downtown Chicago, computer, medicine, etc.
Instead of using an offline and explicit judgment task to assess the perception of plausibility, the
current study used an online and implicit measurement of the reader’s perception of plausibility.
After reading every two sentences that describe the status of a character’s goal (e.g., having an
explicit goal vs. having no explicit goal) and an action performed by the character (e.g., going to
a salon vs. going to a mall), the participant read a target sentence describing the outcome of the
character’s action (e.g., X got a hair-cut). The reading time of this target sentence was measured
as the dependent measure. With this design, perception of plausibility is operationalized as the
reading time of a target sentence that describes the outcome of an action. It is assumed that
reading time is short if the outcome is plausible and vice versa.
Overview of Study
The purpose of this study is to investigate if validation (defined as judgment of
plausibility, which has the same meaning as judgment of coherence) is affected by the presence
of an explicit goal and level of semantic constraint between the antecedent action and the
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outcome. In two experiments, participants read a set of three-sentence micro stories. S1
describes the status of a goal; S2 describes an action; S3 describes the outcome of the action (See
Table 2.1). This outcome is always consistent with the goal described in S1. Validation was
assessed by measuring the reading time of S3. Across the two experiments, the presence of the
goal was systematically manipulated. Additionally, the level of lower level semantic constraint
was manipulated between the actions specified in S2 and the outcome described in S3.
In Experiment 1, the presence of the goal in S1 was manipulated along with the level of
semantic constraint between the action (in S2) and the outcome (in S3). However, as is noted in
the materials for Experiment 1, the goal object is present in both the goal sentence and the
outcome sentence (e.g., beer). As such, Experiment 2 was conducted to determine if the impact
of the presence of an explicit goal affects validation over and above the presence of a goal object
(See Table 2.1).
Hypotheses
There are several hypotheses regarding the relationship between the presence of a goal
and semantic constraint. The predictions based on these hypotheses for each of the experiments
will be discussed in the introduction to those experiments in Chapters 2 and 3.
Causal Constraint Hypothesis
The causal constraint hypothesis assumes that validation is facilitated by the presence of
a goal statement that states the desire of an outcome and importantly motivates the action that
leads to the outcome. Actions that have been causally elaborated by the presence of an explicit
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Table 2.1
A sample story used in Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 1

S1: Joe really wanted a beer (goal present) /Joe finished a hard day at
work (goal absent).
S2: He went to a bar after work (high semantic constraint) / He went
to a restaurant after work (low semantic constraint).

Experiment 2

S1: Joe really wanted a beer (explicit goal) / Joe saw a beer bottle
(goal object).
S2: He went to a bar after work (high semantic constraint) / He went
to a restaurant after work (low semantic constraint).

Experiments 1 & 2

S3: He got a beer and felt much better.

goal should be more available when processing the outcome than actions that have not been
elaborated by a goal. A strong version of this hypothesis is grounded in the observation that
goals have a special status in discourse processing (Lutz & Radvansky, 1997; Magliano &
Radvansky, 2001; Trabasso & Suh, 1993; Trabasso, van den Broek, & Suh, 1989; Suh &
Trabasso, 1993). If goals have a special status in discourse processing because they motivate
actions, it is possible that the presence of a goal will override the effect of semantic constraint.
Additionally, goals elaborate the actions that lead to outcomes, and therefore their presence
should increase the likelihood that knowledge needed to validate the relationship between the
action and outcome will be accessible relative to when the goal is not explicitly stated.
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Semantic Constraint Hypothesis
The semantic constraint hypothesis assumes that validation is affected by situational
constraint on possible actions / outcomes. The logic of this is consistent with the bottom-up
viewpoint that validation is modified by feature overlap via constraint satisfaction. Figure 2.3
provides a visual logic underlying this assumption. When there is a relatively high amount of
semantic overlap between an action and an outcome, an outcome will not only send a strong
retrieval signal back to the action, but will also lead to a higher level of activation of world
knowledge, relative to when there is low semantic overlap.

Figure 2.3. The role of semantic quality in the activation of knowledge.

CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 1
This dissertation adopts the viewpoint of validation (defined as the judgment of
plausibility) as a passive and routine process. With respect to this viewpoint, it is assumed that
spreading activation, passive integration, and validation are three parallel but asynchronous
processes. The processes are asynchronous in the sense that the second process operates on the
output of the first process; and the third process operates on the output of the second process
(Cook, 2014; Cook & O’Brien, 2014; O’Brien & Cook, 2016 a, 2016 b). This mechanism assigns
the role of a mediator to the second process. Specifically, the present study postulates that
coherence perception mediates the relation between spreading activation and validation. Based
on the evidence from Todaro, Millis, & Dandotkar (2010), perception of coherence is affected by
two constraints: causal and semantic. When textual elements are perceived as causally or
semantically related, the mental model constructed based on these elements is coherent and
hence plausible.
One purpose of Experiment 1 was to investigate the presence of an explicit goal as a
causal constraint against which the cohesion between an action and outcome is evaluated. The
causal constraint hypothesis predicts a main effect of causal constraint. Specifically, when the
goal was present, the outcome would be perceived as more plausible than when the goal was
absent—and this would be reflected in the shorter reading time of the outcome statement.
Experiment 1 also explored the extent to which semantic constraint between an antecedent action
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(e.g., character going to a bar versus going to a restaurant) and an outcome (character drinks a
beer) facilitates the validation processes. The bottom-up approach to validation assumes that the
validation of an outcome will be facilitated when there is a relatively high level of semantic
constraint between the action and outcome than when there is low constraint. The semantic
constraint hypothesis predicts a main effect of semantic constraint: reading time for the high
constraint condition would be shorter than for the low constraint condition. The strong version of
the causal constraint hypothesis predicts an interaction between causal constraint and semantic
constraint (see Figure 3.1). This prediction is based on the findings of Wolfe, Magliano, &
Larsen (2005). Wolfe et al. found in Experiment 2B that when the causal relation between two
sentences was high, semantic relation between the two sentences had no impacts on reading
times. Based on this observation, it is predicted in the current experiment that when the goal is
present, there will be a strong causal relation between the action and its outcome and this strong
causal relation will override the effect of lower level semantic cues.
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Figure 3.1. Predictions made by the strong version of the causal constraint hypothesis.
Models and Power Analysis
Models
Four crossed-random-effect models were constructed to analyze the data. A null model
was first constructed as baseline measure:
Yij = 𝛾0 + Ɛ𝑖𝑗
Where
Yij = Observed reading time for participant i and text j
𝛾0 = Expected mean reading time for the overall sample
Ɛ𝑖𝑗 = Residual deviation from the grand mean for participant i and text j
Then, participants and texts were entered as random effects in the second model:
Yij = 𝛾0 + 𝜇0𝑖 + 𝑣0𝑗 + Ɛ𝑖𝑗
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Where
𝜇0𝑖 = random effect for participant i
𝑣0𝑗 = random effect for text j
Model fit was estimated by calculating the reduction in -2LL deviance when random or
fixed effects were entered an equation. The significance of the two random effects was tested by
assessing the variance components of participants and texts (𝜇0𝑖 and 𝑣0𝑗 ). After these, two fixed
effects were entered the third model:
Yij = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑗 + 𝛾2 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑗 + 𝜇0𝑖 + 𝑣0𝑗 + Ɛ𝑖𝑗
Where
𝛾1 = main effect of causal constraint
𝛾2 = main effect of semantic constraint
In this model, the major parameters of interests are 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 , which represent the main
effect of causal constraint and the main effect of semantic constraint accordingly. The interaction
between causal constraint and semantic constraint was investigated by constructing a separate
crossed-random effect model. In this model, texts and participants were entered as random
effects; causal constraint, semantic constraint, and the interaction between the two factors were
entered as fixed effects:
Yij = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑗 + 𝛾2 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑗 + 𝛾3 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑦 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑗 + 𝜇0𝑖 + 𝑣0𝑗 + Ɛ𝑖𝑗
Where
𝛾1 = simple effect of causal constraint conditioned on the zero values of other predictors
𝛾2 = simple effect of semantic constraint conditioned on the zero values of other predictors
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𝛾3 = interaction between causal constraint and semantic constraint
Power Analysis
The 30/30 rule (a minimum of 30 groups in level 2 and 30 observations per group in level
1) was adhered to achieve sufficient power (Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998; Maas & Hox, 2004, 2005;
Mok, 1995). In the current crossed-random-effect model, the level-1 sample size is a
multiplication of the number of participants by the number of texts read by each participant. If
the 30/30 rule is adhered, the sample size at level 1 will be at least 900 (30 x 30). This sample
size will attain a power of .85 for medium effect size and 1.00 for large effect size (Scherbaum &
Ferreter, 2009). Assuming a small effect size, a sample size of 40 at level 2 is required to attain
maximum power (Scherbaum & Ferreter, 2009). In other words, the minimum number of
participants required to attain sufficient power (assuming a small effect size) is 40.

Methods

Participants

The participants were 48 psychology freshmen recruited from the NIU participant pool.
They received course credit for their participation. Four participants (8.3%) were dropped
because they failed to verify at least 75% of the true/false statements that indicate comprehension
and cautious reading. The remaining 44 participants had an average age of 19.9 and 22 of them
(50%) were males.
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Design

Experiment 1 contained a 2 (Causal constraint: goal absent vs. goal present) X 2
(Semantic constraint: low vs. high) within participants design. Reading time on the outcome
sentence was the dependent variable

Materials

The materials were 32 sets of sentences. In each set of sentences, the first sentence
contained the goal present manipulation. In the goal present condition, it described a goal of the
character that was obtained in the final sentence. In the goal absent condition, it described an
initiating event that afforded inferring the goal and therefore provided a causal antecedent for the
outcome (Trabasso, van den Broek, & Suh, 1989). The second sentence described an action and
also contained the semantic constraint manipulation. In the high constraint condition, the action
(or the tool used in the action) occurred in a location that afforded achieving the goal. In the low
constraint condition, the tool or action also afforded the goal, but had a lower semantic
association with it. The third sentence described a plausible outcome of the action. Latent
semantic analysis (LSA; Landuaer & Dumais, 1997; http://lsa.colorado.edu/) was used to assess
the degree of semantic overlap between S2 (action) and S3 (outcome). This was used as a proxy
for the manipulation check of semantic constraint. Specifically, the TASA (Touchstone Applied
Science Associates) space was used to show that there were stronger semantic associations in the
high semantic constraint condition than in the low semantic constraint condition. Document to
document comparisons were made using 300 factors. Mean LSA cosigns were higher in the high

29
constraint condition (M = .40, SD = .21) than in the low constraint condition (M = .34, SD = .20),
t (31) = 3.235, p = .003, Cohen’s d = .29. The number of characters in S3 was restricted within
the range of 31 and 36. The fourth sentence was a verification statement. This statement was
either true or false according to the story. In this set of materials, half of the items had a true
verification statement and half had a false one. The purpose of this verification task was to
screen participants. To be included as a qualified participant, an individual should correctly
verify at least 75% of the true/false statements.
The 32 sets of sentences are shown in the Appendix. For each set of experimental
sentences, four texts were generated by combining a condition of S1 with a condition of S2. As
such, four experimental lists were generated and counterbalanced using a Latin Square design.
The sentences were presented to each participant in a random order.

Procedure

The participants were tested individually on PC computers with E-Prime. They were told
that the purpose of the study was to investigate how people perceive the possibility of everyday
events. Each set of sentences was presented to the participant one sentence at a time. The
participants read the sentences at their own pace and they pressed the space bar to advance the
reading. After the offset of the third sentence, the participants saw an affirmative statement and
they judged whether this statement was supported by the story. The participant made a binary
YES/NO response. The F key was marked as YES and the J key was marked as NO. After
making a YES/NO response, the participant saw the word READY at the center of the screen.
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This indicated that a new trial would begin when the space bar was pressed. All participants were
given four practice trials before the presentation of the test materials.

Results and Discussion
The dependent variable was the participant’s reading time of the third sentence. All data
points were sorted according to their 2 (causal constraint: goal absent vs. goal present) x 2
(semantic constraint: low vs. high) group membership. Reading times that were shorter than 500
ms or three standard deviations higher than the group mean were removed. This led to 1.7% of
the observations being removed from the analyses. The means of the four experimental
conditions are shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2. Mean reading times of the target sentences by the four experimental conditions in
Experiment 1.
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Data points from 44 participants were used to construct a series of crossed-random-effect
models, with participants and texts as random effects; and causal constraint, semantic
constraint, and the interaction between the two factors as level-1 fixed effects. Using SPSS
syntax provided by Carson and Beeson (2013), a null model was first constructed for baseline
comparisons. Then, the random effects of participants and texts were entered. Analysis of -2 Log
Likelihood showed that the model with random effects fit the dataset better than the null model,
χ 2 (1) = 482.45, p < .001. The random effect of participants was significant, Wald Z = 4.43, p
< .001, indicating that the mean reading times of individual participants deviated significantly
from the grand mean. The random effect of texts was also significant, Wald Z = 2.94, p = .003,
indicating that the mean readings times for individual texts deviated significantly from the grand
mean.
After the fixed effects of causal constraint and semantic constraint were added to the
random-effect model, -2LL deviance reduced by 39.34. This reduction was significant, χ 2 (1) =
39.34, p < .001, suggesting that the model with fixed effects fit the dataset better than the model
with random effects only. Analyses of fixed effects revealed significant main effects for causal
constraint, F (1, 1309) = 25.53, p < .001 and semantic constraint, F (1, 1314) = 14.40, p < .001.
When the interaction term was added to the model, the new model did not fit the data better than
the previous model, χ 2 (1) = 0.90, p > .05. The interaction term was not significant, F (1, 1309)
= .90, p = .343.
The simple effects that were of interest were the effects of semantic constraint at the two
levels of causal constraint. When the goal was absent, reading times for high semantic constraint
(M = 2002, SD = 679) were significantly faster than for low semantic constraint (M = 2093, SD =
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828), F (1, 1311) = 4.09. p = .043. When the goal was present, reading times for high semantic
constraint (M = 1821, SD = 625) were also significantly faster than for low semantic constraint
(M = 1964, SD = 762), F (1, 1311) = 11.26. p = .001.
The results of Experiment 1 provided support for the weak form (but not the strong form)
of the causal constraint hypothesis and the semantic constraint hypothesis. The outcome
sentences were read faster when the goal was explicitly stated and when there was high semantic
constraint. This suggests that the influence of causal relatedness and semantic constraint work in
parallel and their effects are additive in support of validation, which is consistent with RI-VAL
(O’Brien & Cook, 2016 a, 2016 b).
However, a potential criticism for this experiment is that a confound might have
exaggerated the main effect of causal constraint. In the goal-present condition, a goal object
(e.g., beer) is mentioned in S1 and this object is mentioned again in the target sentence. In the
goal-absent condition, this object is mentioned only in the target sentence. Participants in the
goal-present condition had a previous exposure to the goal object before encountering it again in
the target sentence; this arrangement might have speeded up the reading of the target sentence
due to 1) repetition priming, and 2) increased text cohesion. Repetition priming refers to the
improved performance on a repeated stimulus and this can happen even when an individual has
no explicit memory for the stimulus (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Morton, 1979). Moreover, nounoverlap (repetition of the same word in two sentences) is considered as an index of text cohesion
(McNamara, Louwerse, McCarthy, & Graesser, 2010). With noun-overlap, the texts in the goalpresent condition have an additional index of cohesion compared to the texts in the goal-absent
condition. The shorter reading times observed in the goal-present condition could have been
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caused by an increased-level of text cohesion with the presence of a goal and with the repetition
of a noun. To isolate the effect of the presence of a goal on the reading times of the target
sentences, the goal present condition was compared directly to a goal-object condition in
Experiment 2.

CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 1, there was an overlap of a noun (e.g., the word beer) between the first
and third sentences in the goal present condition but not in the initiating-event condition. This
was a potential confound producing or exaggerating the main effect of causal constraint in
Experiment 1. To control the effect of this confound, the goal present condition was pitted
directly against a goal-object-only condition in Experiment 2. For example, Joe really wanted a
beer was pitted against Joe saw a beer bottle. If the presence of an explicit goal is over and
above the presence of a goal object, then, the results of Experiment 2 will be identical to those in
Experiment 1.
Methods
Participants
The participants were 77 psychology freshmen recruited from the NIU participant pool.
All participants received course credit for their participation. Responses from five participants
(6%) were excluded from the dataset because these participants failed to provide a correct
response to at least 75% of the verification statements. After screening, the number of qualified
participants was 75; 38 (53%) of them were males. The average age was 19.93.
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Design

Experiment 2 contained a 2 (Causal constraint: goal object only vs. goal present) X 2
(Semantic constraint: low vs. high) within participants design. Reading time on the outcome
sentence was the dependent variable.
Materials
The materials are identical to those in Experiment 1 with one exception. The first
sentence in both versions mentioned the goal object. When the goal wasn’t present, the first
sentence described the character becoming aware of or associated with the goal object, (e.g., see
a bottle of beer). This constituted an initiating event because becoming aware of desirable
objects can be interpreted as an initiating event (Trabasso & Magliano, 1996; Trabasso & Suh,
1993. Trabasso et al., 1989). In this way, the presence of the goal object was maintained. To
reflect this aspect of the design, the two levels of the causal constraint variable became: goal
present and goal-object only. The materials were prepared and presented to the participants in the
same way as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1.
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Models and Analyses

The design and analyses were identical to those in Experiment 1: First, a null model was
constructed to obtain baseline measure. Then, the random effects of participants and texts were
entered the second model. After this, the fixed effects of causal constraint and semantic
constraint were entered the third model. Finally, the interaction term was entered the fourth
model.
Results and Discussion
The dependent measure was the reading times of sentence 3. Measures that were shorter
than 500 ms or three standard deviations longer than the group mean were eliminated from the
dataset. This led to 2.8% of the observations being removed from the analyses. After the
elimination of outliers, four group means were computed (see Figure 4.1). Four cross-randomeffects models (null, random effect, main effect, & interaction) were constructed to evaluate the
random effects of participants and texts, as well as the fixed effects of causal and semantic
constraints.
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Figure 4.1. Mean reading times of the target sentences by the four experimental conditions in
Experiment 2.

The random-effect model fit the dataset better than the null model, χ 2 (1) = 39.34, p
< .001. The random effect of participants was significant, Wald Z = 5.61, p < .001; the random
effect of texts was also significant, Wald Z = 3.22, p = .001. When the fixed effects of causal and
semantic constraints were added to the equation, model fit improved, χ 2 (1) = 9.781, p = .001.
The main effect of causal constraint was significant, F (1, 2138) = 7.48, p = .006; but the main
effect of semantic constraint was not significant, F (1, 2143) = 2.31, p = .129. When the
interaction term was added to the equation, the model did not fit the data better than when there
was no interaction term in it, χ 2 (1) = 0.249, p > .05. It was not surprising that the interaction
term was not significant, F (1, 2138) = .249, p = .618.
The simple effects of semantic constraint were not significant for both levels of causal
constraint. The patterns of group-mean differences mirrored those in Experiment 1 but the sizes
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of the differences did not reach significance. When S1 describes a goal object but not the goal
itself, reading times for the high-constraint condition was only 24 ms faster than the lowconstraint condition, F (1, 2140) = .520, p = .471. When S1 states an explicit goal, reading times
for the high-constraint condition was 49 ms faster than the low-constraint condition, F (1, 2141)
= 2.04, p = .153.
The results of Experiment 2 supported the causal constraint hypothesis and demonstrated
that the presence of a goal supported validation over and above a goal object. Experiment 2 did
not provide support for the semantic constraint hypothesis. These result patterns are consistent
with those reported by Wolfe, Magliano, and Larson (2005). In Experiment 1, Wolfe et al. found
that causal relationships have a stronger impact on moment-to-moment processing (which is the
case in the current experiment) than lower level semantic overlap.

CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to understand factors that affect the validation of outcomes in
the context of narratives. On primary factor of interest is the presence of an explicit goal, which
causally elaborates the action that leads to the outcome (Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso, van
den Broek, & Suh, 1989). Another factor is the semantic relatedness between an action and its
outcome. When an outcome is proceeded by an action, the semantic relationship between the
action and the outcome is expected to affect people’s perception of the likelihood of the outcome
(Wolfe, Magliano, & Larsen, 2005). Two hypotheses were tested across two experiments. The
causal constraint hypothesis assumes that validation is facilitated with the presences of an
explicit goal. The semantic constraint hypothesis assumes that validation is facilitated when there
is a high degree of feature overlap between an action and an outcome. Both the causal and
semantic constraint hypotheses were supported in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 was conducted to
assess if the presence of an explicit goal has an impact over and above the mentioning of a goal
object. The causal constraint hypothesis predicts a main effect of goal object whereas the
semantic constraint hypothesis predicts a main effect of feature overlap between the action and
the outcome. The results supported the causal constraint hypothesis but not the semantic
constraint hypothesis. As such, there was consistent support for the causal constraint hypothesis
across both experiments, but inconsistent support for the semantic constraint hypothesis.
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How to best explain these results? The RI-VAL model (Cook & O’Brien, 2014; O’Brien
& Cook, 2016 a, 2016 b) provides a basis for the explanation of some aspects of the present
results. RI-VAL assumes that validation is supported by memory retrieval. Specifically, in the
current project, the outcome statement sends out a parallel retrieval signal to semantically
aligned prior discourse content and relevant world knowledge, such that when the outcome
statement is read, the action statement is reactivated in a passive mechanism. The level of
activation of the action is related to how elaborated it is in the prior discourse context (Albrecht
& Myers, 1995). Goals causally elaborate actions (Suh & Trabasso, 1993), which affects the
general accessibility and activation level of those actions in the mental model and working
memory (Langston & Trabasso, 1999; Langston, Trabasso, & Magliano, 1999). Apparently, the
more causally elaborated the actions are, the easier it is to process its outcome, which is
indicative of a strong positive outcome of the validation process. Figure 2.3 provides an
explanation for why semantic constraint between action and outcome affects validation in the
context of RI-VAL. In the high-constraint condition, the words in the outcome and action
statements are close in semantic distance (an assumption validated with LSA). As such, there
was likely a relatively higher amount of overlap in the knowledge activated from reading the
action and outcome sentences in the high constraint condition than the low constraint condition.
This study is consistent with research that shows that goals have a special status in
narrative comprehension (Long, Golding, & Graesser, 1992; Long, Golding, Graesser. & Clark,
1990). For example, goals motivate readers to generate causal inferences that connect an action
to its outcome (Suh & Trabasso, 1993) or connect an action to the motive of the actor (Singer &
Halldorson, 1996). Goals explain the purposes of actions or subgoals (Trabasso et al., 1989).
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Readers monitor closely goal-related information. This is particularly true when the goal is
unsatisfied (Albrecht & Myers, 1995; Fletcher & Bloom, 1988; Long & Golding, 1993;
Magliano & Radvansky, 2001; Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso et al., 1989; van den Broek,
1995), which was the case in the present study. That is, the goals were not satisfied until the
outcome sentence was read. Narratives with unsatisfied superordinate goals have stronger causal
networks than narratives without (Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985; Trabasso et al., 1989).
The impact of semantic constraint between action and outcome was less robust in
Experiment 2, compared to Experiment 1. This weak impact of semantic constraints in the
presence of causal constraints was demonstrated by Wolfe, Magliano, & Larsen (2005). Wolfe et
al. showed that causal relationship has a stronger influence on moment-to-moment processing
than semantic overlap at the lexical level. This may indicate that the situation model provides a
primary basis for supporting validation. The influence of lower level semantic cues may become
more apparent when the sentences are not causally related (Wolf et al., 2005).
Validation is receiving increased attention in recent years because it addresses the
question why readers fail to detect false information in a text (Richter & Rapp, 2014).
Researchers are interested in finding out factors that prevent readers from detecting inconsistent
or anomalous information in a text. In response to the increased interest in validation, some older
comprehension models have been modified to emphasize the role of validation. For example, RIVAL (O’Brien & Cook, 2016 a, 2016 b) is a modified version of the two-stage ConstructionIntegration model (Kintsch, 1988, 1998). One major difference between RI-VAL and CI is that
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in RI-VAL, comprehension is a three-stage cyclical process. The stage of validation is added to
emphasize the role of plausibility judgment in the encoding phase of information processing.
The results of this study are consistent with the assumption of RI-Val that multiple
sources of information are activated independently during comprehension. These sources of
information are integrated passively. The integrated information is then validated against
background knowledge before instantiating into long-term memory. Within the framework of
this model, factors that affect the outcomes of integration will mediate the outcomes of
validation because validation, integration, and reactivation are three parallel asynchronous
processes dependent on each other. Consistent with the C-I model (Kintsch, 1988), RI-VAL
assumes that integration is a process of coherence building via constraint satisfaction. Two types
of constraints have been identified as having an impact on the judgment of
coherence/plausibility: causal and semantic constraints (Connell & Keane, 2004; Todaro, Millis,
& Dandotkar, 2010). Todaro et al. (2010) demonstrated that contents with strong causal relations
at the event level or strong semantic relations at the word level were rated more coherent than
contents that have weak causal or semantic relations. Using a reading time paradigm, it was
demonstrated in this dissertation that sentences with strong causal or semantic relations with
other sentences were read faster than sentences with weak causal or semantic relations with other
sentences. Assuming that reading time correlates with the ease of plausibility judgment such that
more plausible events are read faster, the facilitation in reading time is interpreted as indicative
of the perception of plausibility, which changes as a function of causal and semantic relatedness
among sentences.
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A novel aspect of this study is that the outcome is always plausible. Many other studies
typically have a condition in which the content is not plausible (Cook & O’Brien, 2014; Isberner
& Richter, 2013; Matsuki, Hare, Scheepers, Chow, Elman, & McRae, 2011; Richter, Schroeder,
& Wöhrmann, 2009; Singer, 1993; Warren & McConnell, 2007). This underscores the
importance of understanding the continuum of plausibility. Would these factors affect validation
for implausible outcomes? For example, would the presence of a goal make an implausible
outcome seem more plausible? Consider the following text:
Joe really wanted a coffee/ Joe finished a hard day at work.
He went to a bar after work.
He got a coffee and felt much better.
Because it is not typical for people to drink coffee in a bar, readers will experience inconsistency
effect when they read that Joe went to a bar and got a coffee. The question that is of interest is:
Will this inconsistency effect be reduced with the presence of a goal that is consistent with the
outcome (i.e., Joe wanted a coffee and he got a coffee, regardless of where he went to get the
coffee).
It is important to note that this study relied on reading times. In discourse psychology,
reading time has been used to indicate the ease of many different kinds of mental processes,
including, but not limited to, the generation of bridging (Keenan, Baillet, & Brown, 1984; Myers,
Shinjo, & Duffy, 1987) or predictive inferences (Guéraud, Tapiero, and O’Brien, 2008; Peracchi
& O’Brien, 2004), detection of contradictions (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; O’Brien & Albrecht,
1992), the effect of priming (Albrecht & Myers, 1995; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1978), the ease of
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activation (Myers & O’Brien, 1998; O’Brien & Myers, 1999), integration (Long & Lea, 2005;
Wolfe, Magliano, & Larsen, 2005) and validation (Singer, Halldorson, Lear, & Andrusiak.,
1992; Singer, 1993). For this reason, the dependent measure in this dissertation is subject to
alternative interpretations. Do longer reading times reflect difficulty in activation, integration, or
validation? In spite of this controversy, sentence (or word) reading time has been widely used to
evaluate plausibility judgment, usually coupled with another type of dependent measure to
provide convergent evidence in the same study. For example, Singer and colleagues (Singer,
Halldorson, Lear, & Andrusiak., 1992; Singer, 1993) used both a sentence reading paradigm and
a question-answering paradigm to test the hypothesis that readers validate a bridging inference
against prior knowledge. In a series of studies, Singer and colleagues asked participants to read
sentence pairs that had either a far or close causal relation. After reading the two sentences,
participants answered a simple YES/NO question. The researchers measured the reading time of
the second sentence and the response latency of the simple question. In this design, sentence
reading time might indicate both the process of making an inference and the process of
validating the inference. Response latency, however, provided side evidence supporting the
researchers’ claim that readers validated the inference they made to bridge the two sentences, not
just making the inference.
Another way to bolster the use of reading time as a measure of plausibility judgment is to
include a direct offline measure of plausibility judgment in the same study. (Matsuki et al., 2011;
Warren & McConnell, 2007). For example, in a norming study, Matsuki et al. (2011) asked
participants to rate how likely events like “Donna used the hose to wash her filthy hair / Donna
used the shampoo to wash her filthy hair” occur in the real world. In a separate experiment,
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participants read the sentences in the norming study and the reading latencies for individual
words were measured with an eye-tracker. Matsuki et al. found that the likelihood ratings
obtained in the norming study significantly predicted the reading latencies of the target words
(hair in this example). To strengthen the confidence that the reading times in the current study
reflect plausibility judgment, a norming study like the one used by Matsuki et al. might be
considered. One way to norm the materials in the Appendix is to replace S3 with a question like
“how likely it is that Joseph would get a beer?” If these plausibility ratings from a separate
experiment are consistent with the results from Experiments 1 and 2, then the claim that sentence
reading time reflects the plausibility of the event described in the sentence is warranted.
Validation as a process of comprehension is broadly defined as checking the plausibility
of bridging inferences (Singer, 1993) or the outcome of integration (O’Brien & Cook, 2016 a &
b). This check may be based on knowledge outside of the text or on the consistency of old and
new information within a text. In the current study, validating the outcome statement (Joe got a
beer) against the goal statement (Joe wanted a beer) involves the checking of consistency within
a text. However, validating the outcome (Joe got a beer) against its antecedent action (Joe went
to a bar) involves an extra step of activating world knowledge—that people drink beer in a bar.
It has been repetitively demonstrated that sentence reading time is affected by the level of
casual and semantic relatedness (Myers, Shinjo, & Duffy, 1987; Todaro et al., 2010; Wolfe et al.,
2005) between the target sentence and prior discourse context. One interpretation of this
observation is that the text changes in level of coherence when the causal and semantic relations
between its elements vary (Todaro et al., 2010). In light of this argument, the results of the
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current study can be interpreted as indication of how perception of coherence changes as a
function of causal and semantic constraints. It has been assumed in this dissertation that
perception of coherence is the same concept as perception of plausibility—when the text depicts
a plausible event, then the text is coherent and vice versa. This assumption should be tested
empirically though. To verify that judgment of plausibility and judgment of coherence are based
on the same criteria, researchers could design two rating tasks (one asks the subjects to make
judgment on plausibility and another on coherence) using the same set of materials. If the results
of the two rating tasks correlate, then the two concepts are the same.
The way in which the target sentences are written might create noises in the results. All
these sentences are compound sentences. For example: 1) He bought a car that was in his price
range; 2) He got a beer and felt much better; 3) She enjoyed the movie with her best friend; 4)
He got the cash he needed to get dinner. The first example describes an action. The second
example describes an action and a psychological state. The third example describes a
psychological state. The fourth example describes two actions. The variability and complexity of
these target sentences may need to be coded systematically and entered the regression model as a
covariate.
This study has some implications for the field of social cognition. Cognitive social
psychologists are interested in learning how people perceive intentionality because it explains
behavior and it mediates the judgment of responsibility (e.g., an agent is responsible for an
offensive behavior if the behavior is intended) (e.g., Malle and Knobe, 1997). Malle and Knobe
(1997) found that the judgment of intentionality is affected by five components: a desire for an
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outcome, beliefs about a causal relation between an action and an outcome, an intention to
perform the action, possession of the skills that are required to perform the action, and awareness
of a plausible outcome when performing the action. Similarly, theories of narrative
comprehension assume that intentionality is one important index (among time, space, causation,
and protagonist) that readers keep track of when constructing a mental model to represent a
narrative (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). When intentionality
is studied in discourse psychology, the focus is on goal-directed actions. An action is viewed as
intended if the protagonist has a goal to accomplish the outcome of that action before performing
the action, Theories of narrative comprehension assume that goals have a special status in
coherence building because goals explain the causes of actions, and narratives are about agents
performing actions (Trabasso, van den Broek, & Suh, 1989; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998).
Moreover, there is some evidence that causal relations based on intentionality are perceived to be
stronger than other types of causal relationships (e.g., physical or psychological, but not based on
intentions) (Trabasso et al., 1989). However, Malle and colleagues do not ascribe goal as a
special status in theories of how people understand intentionality (Malle, 1999; Malle & Knobe,
1997). While there are those who have argued that narrative comprehension involves the same
cognitive systems that support understanding of real world events (e.g., Gernsbacher, Varner, &
Faust, 1990), it is possible that goals may have a special status in narrative comprehension.
However, in cognitive social psychology, other cues of causality and plausibility (other than
goals) may also have a role to play when understanding intentional behaviors in the real world.
This is an issue ripe for future research.
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Conclusion

Readers construct mental representations of a text when reading (Sanford & Garrod,
1981; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky,
1998) and the plausibility of these mental representations is routinely monitored (Isberner &
Richter, 2013; Matsuki et al., 2011; Warren & McConnell, 2007). This process is called
validation in some literature (O’Brien & Cook, 2016 a; Richter et al., 2009; Singer et al., 1992).
The results of the present study are consistent with the assumption that validation in narrative
context can be a fast and effortless process when the to-be-validated event is readily retrieved
from memory (Isberner & Richter, 2013; Richter et al., 2009). This study shows that a mental
representation is considered plausible (or coherent) if elements in this representation are causally
or semantically related (Connell & Keane, 2004; Todaro et al., 2010).
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Story 1
S1 (goal + goal object): Joseph really wanted a beer.
S1 (goal object alone): Joseph saw a beer bottle.
S1 (neither): Joseph finished a hard day at work.
S2 (strong): He went to a bar after work.
S2: (weak): He went to a restaurant after work.
He got a beer and felt much better.
Joseph got a drink after work. Y
Story 2
S1 (goal + goal object): Christopher wanted to gamble.
S1 (goal object alone): Christopher’s friend liked to gamble.
S1 (neither): Christopher had nothing to do for the weekend.
S2 (strong): He went to a casino.
S2: (weak): He had his buddies come to his house.
He won some money gambling by the end of the evening.
Christopher was a gambler. Y
Story 3
S1 (goal + goal object): Dave wanted to go on a cruise.
S1 (goal object alone): Dave saw a cruise ship ad.
S1 (neither): Dave retired recently.
S2 (strong): He logged onto Royal Caribbean website.
S2: (weak): He logged onto his expedia.com account.
He was able to book a cruise in no time.
Dave hated traveling. N
Story 4
S1 (goal + goal object): Bobby wanted to buy a car.
S1 (goal object alone): Bobby saw the ad of a car.
S1 (neither): Bobby had saved some money.
S2 (strong): He went to a Ford dealership.
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S2: (weak): He went to a local dealership.
He bought a car that was in his price range.
Bobby bought a used car from his friend. N
Story 5
S1 (goal + goal object): Lillian needed to buy a new dress.
S1 (goal object alone): Lillian saw an ad for dresses.
S1 (neither): Lillian had a free afternoon.
S2 (strong): She went to Macy’s.
S2: (weak): She went to a mall.
She bought a new dress that she loved.
Lillian was a tomboy. N
Story 6
S1 (goal + goal object): Sophie wanted to adopt a cat.
S1 (goal object alone): Sophie read a story about a cat.
S1 (neither): Sophie read a story about the benefits of keeping a pet.
S2 (strong): She visited the Feline Rescue Foundation.
S2: (weak): She visited a local shelter.
She found a cat that seemed to really like her.
Sophie was an animal lover. Y
Story 7
S1 (goal + goal object): Sharon wanted to refinance her mortgage.
S1 (goal object alone): Sharon saw that mortgage rates were very low.
S1 (neither): Sharon’s roof needed to be replaced.
S2 (strong): She logged onto MoneyTree.com.
S2: (weak): She logged onto her computer.
She got a good rate on her mortgage and was relieved.
Sharon needed to borrow money. Y
Story 8
S1 (goal + goal object): Betty wanted to see a movie.
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S1 (goal object alone): Betty read the review of a movie.
S1 (neither): Betty felt bored Friday night.
S2 (strong): She went to Randal 15 Cinema.
S2: (weak): She checked show times on her iPhone.
She enjoyed the movie with her best friend.
Betty was alone on Friday night. N
Story 9
S1 (goal + goal object): Ken wanted to give his wife roses.
S1 (goal object alone): Ken compared his wife to a rose.
S1 (neither): Ken thought his wife was an angel.
S2 (strong): He went to a flower shop.
S2: (weak): He went to a supermarket.
He found gorgeous roses that she would love.
Ken was a bachelor. N
Story 10
S1 (goal + goal object): Leslie wanted to see the Van Gogh exhibit.
S1 (goal object alone): Leslie saw some Van Goghs in an art book.
S1 (neither): Leslie had just taken a course in Art history.
S2 (strong): She visited the Art Institute.
S2: (weak): She visited a museum.
She admired the Van Gogh landscapes most of all.
Leslie loved art. Y
Story 11
S1 (goal + goal object): John wanted to get a haircut.
S1 (goal object alone): John received a coupon for a haircut.
S1 (neither): John had a big date this weekend.
S2 (strong): He went to the barbershop.
S2: (weak): He went to a strip mall.
He got the best haircut that he ever had.
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John wanted to dye his hair. N
Story 12
S1 (goal + goal object): Cindy wanted to get a family portrait.
S1 (goal object alone): Cindy saw a friend’s family portrait.
S1 (neither): Cindy was thinking about how fast her kids were growing up.
S2 (strong): She booked an appointment with a photographer.
S2: (weak): She booked an appointment at a studio.
The portrait turned out better than she expected.
Cindy had looked for someone to take her picture. Y
Story 13
S1 (goal + goal object): Maggie was craving for sushi at lunchtime.
S1 (goal object alone): Maggie saw a discarded sushi box in the trash.
S1 (neither): Maggie was very hungry at lunchtime.
S2 (strong): She reserved a table at a Japanese restaurant.
S2: (weak): She reserved a table at an oriental restaurant.
The sushi was some of the best she ever had.
Maggie disliked oriental food. N
Story 14
S1 (goal + goal object): Neil needed to buy a plane ticket.
S1 (goal object alone): Neil saw plane tickets were on sale.
S1 (neither): Neil had racked up some points in his frequent flyer’s account.
S2 (strong): He logged in to his United Airlines account.
S2: (weak): He visited several websites on his iPad.
He got a plane ticket for his visit home.
Neil was planning a trip. Y
Story 15
S1 (goal + goal object): Dan wanted to buy the new iPad.
S1 (goal object alone): Dan saw the ad for the new iPad.
S1 (neither): Dan won a $500 gift card at work.
S2 (strong): He went to an Apple Store.
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S2: (weak): He went to Best Buy.
He got an iPad with a data plan.
Dan bought an iPhone. N
Story 16
S1 (goal + goal object): Pat needed his boarding pass.
S1 (goal object alone): Pat lost his boarding pass.
S1 (neither): Pat’s flight would take off in two hours.
S2 (strong): He stood in line at the United Airlines check-in counter.
S2: (weak): He stood in line at the ticket kiosk.
He got his boarding pass with time to spare.
Pat was taking a plane trip. Y
Story 17
S1 (goal + goal object): Laura decided to exercise daily after work.
S1 (goal object alone): Laura discussed an exercise plan with her friends.
S1 (neither): Laura was not happy with her appearance.
S2 (strong): She signed up for membership at World Gym.
S2: (weak): She signed up for membership at a club for women.
Laura enjoyed her exercise routine more than she thought.
Laura lived a more active life than before. Y
Story 18
S1 (goal + goal object): Carol wanted to take some pictures of Millennium Park.
S1 (goal object alone): Carol really liked her friend’s pictures of Millennium Park.
S1 (neither): Carol was taking a walk in Millennium Park.
S2 (strong): She started the camera app on her iPhone.
S2: (weak): She turned on her iPhone.
She took some great pictures of the sculptures.
Carol used her iPhone to take pictures. Y
Story 19
S1 (goal + goal object): Angus needed to withdraw some cash.
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S1 (goal object alone): Angus spotted a cash-only sign at a counter.
S1 (neither): Angus had a long shopping list.
S2 (strong): He inserted his bankcard into an ATM.
S2: (weak): He stood in line at a teller.
He got the cash he needed to get dinner.
Angus was short of cash. Y
Story 20
S1 (goal + goal object): Daniel needed to see his doctor.
S1 (goal object alone): Daniel saw his doctor regularly.
S1 (neither): Daniel had to take a sick day.
S2 (strong): He called the receptionist at the clinic.
S2: (weak): He called the receptionist at the front desk.
He got a doctor’s appointment the next day.
Daniel wanted to see his lawyer. N
Story 21
S1 (goal + goal object): Fiona needed to catch a bus.
S1 (goal object alone): Fiona saw the bus schedule.
S1 (neither): Fiona could not drive to work today.
S2 (strong): She walked to the nearest stop.
S2: (weak): She walked down the street.
She got on the bus in fifteen minutes.
Fiona was trying to catch a train. N
Story 22
S1 (goal + goal object): Sam wanted to have a romantic night.
S1 (goal object alone): Sam saw a movie called Romantic Night.
S1 (neither): Sam was feeling lonely tonight.
S2 (strong): He asked his girlfriend on a date.
S2: (weak): He asked Jill out to dinner.
He had the most romantic night of his life.
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Sam was a gay man. N
Story 23
S1 (goal + goal object): John needed to apply for a job.
S1 (goal object alone): John was optimistic about the job market.
S1 (neither): John was graduating in two months.
S2 (strong): He sent out a resume.
S2: (weak): He sent out a letter.
He got a job within two weeks.
John was a strong candidate for the job he applied. Y
Story 24
S1 (goal + goal object): Beverly needed a stamp.
S1 (goal object alone): Beverly was a stamp collector.
S1 (neither): Beverly put a check in an envelope.
S2 (strong): She went to the post office.
S2: (weak): She went to the supermarket.
She bought a stamp for his letter.
Beverly was trying to send something through the mail. Y
Story 25
S1 (goal + goal object): Jane needed to get rid of her headache.
S1 (goal object alone): Jane had a history of bad headaches.
S1 (neither): Jane had a lot of stress at work.
S2 (strong): She took some aspirin.
S2: (weak): She took some medicine.
Jane’s headache was gone in half an hour.
Jane felt pain in her stomach. N
Story 26
S1 (goal + goal object): Tim wanted to take his wife to a dinner cruise.
S1 (goal object alone): Tim and his wife had never been to a dinner cruise.
S1 (neither): Tim and his wife had their first anniversary.
S2 (strong): The couple went to Navy Pier Saturday evening.
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S2: (weak): The couple went to Chicago Saturday evening.
They enjoyed their dinner cruise on the Mystic Blue.
Tim and his wife went to a concert. N
Story 27
S1 (goal + goal object): Fay wanted more followers on her Twitter feed.
S1 (goal object alone): Fay had many followers on her Twitter feed.
S1 (neither): Fay had recently opened a new account on Twitter.
S2 (strong): She started a series of tweets on the election.
S2: (weak): She started a series of comments on the election.
She got many followers on her Twitter feed.
Fay was popular on Twitter feed. Y
Story 28
S1 (goal + goal object): Kelly needed to buy textbooks for the semester.
S1 (goal object alone): Kelly estimated the textbook budget for the semester.
S1 (neither): Kelly was registered in several courses this semester.
S2 (strong): She went to the university bookstore.
S2: (weak): She logged into her Amazon.com account.
She bought some textbooks at reduced prices.
Kelly was a student. Y
Story 29
S1 (goal + goal object): Rick needed to calculate averages for his stats class.
S1 (goal object alone): Rick was learning about averages in his stats class.
S1 (neither): Rick was doing homework for his stats class.
S2 (strong): He opened calculator on his tablet.
S2: (weak): He opened a worksheet on his laptop.
Calculating the averages was easier than he thought.
Rick was taking a course in physics. N
Story 30
S1 (goal + goal object): Ann needed to get a new pair of glasses.
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S1 (goal object alone): Ann had a coupon for new glasses.
S1 (neither): Ann had to admit that her eyes were getting worse.
S2 (strong): She visited to LensCrafters.
S2: (weak): She went to Walmart.
Her new pair of glasses looked great.
Ann had problems with her vision. Y
Story 31
S1 (goal + goal object): Ryan needed to have his taxes done.
S1 (goal object alone): Ryan just learned about the new tax laws.
S1 (neither): Ryan was running his own business.
S2 (strong): He visited an accountant.
S2: (weak): He visited a consultant.
He had his taxes done with an unexpected refund.
Ryan did his taxes on his own. N
Story 32
S1 (goal + goal object): Shawn wanted to print some pictures.
S1 (goal object alone): Shawn really liked the pictures he had taken.
S1 (neither): Shawn just got back from his vacation.
S2 (strong): He inserted his SD card into a Kodak kiosk.
S2: (weak): He took his SD card to a Walgreens.
He printed some beautiful pictures at a great price.
Shawn printed his pictures at home. N

